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ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR THEFT
CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN WASHINGTON STATE
Hossein Nowbar
Abstract: The majority of the federal circuit courts hold that prior theft convictions are
not automatically admissible under Evidence Rule 609(a)(2) as crimes of dishonesty or
false statement. The Washington Supreme Court departs from this conclusion and holds
all theft crimes automatically admissible under ER 609(a)(2) as crimes of dishonesty or
false statement. This Comment discusses the inherent problems in Washington's interpre-
tation of the terms "dishonesty or false statement" in ER 609(a)(2) and suggests three
possible solutions that may alleviate those problems.
Rules of evidence are an essential element of every courtroom expe-
rience. Often they determine the outcome of a case. Although most of
the rules of evidence are taken for granted, some are hotly debated.1
One such rule is Evidence Rule (ER) 6092 which permits the impeach-
ment of a witness' credibility through the use of past criminal convic-
tions. ER 609 is one of the most intensely debated rules of evidence in
the State of Washington.3 The Washington Supreme Court has been
unable to provide consistent guidance,4 changing its interpretation of
ER 609 four times in the past eight years.5
The admission of prior convictions into evidence implicates compet-
ing interests. On the one hand, public policy requires that jurors
receive all of the information necessary to make accurate decisions.
Jurors must base their decisions on the credibility of a witness, and the
criminal record of a witness may in some cases be relevant in deter-
mining whether that witness is likely to tell the truth.
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.1, at 473 (3d
ed. 1991).
2. Washington Evidence Rules were adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in 1979. ER
609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, reads in relevant part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness in a criminal or
civil case, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under
the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs the prejudice to the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
WASH. R. EVID. 609.
3. See ROBERT H. ARONSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON 609-10 (1991).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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On the other hand, society has a strong interes: in maintaining a
presumption of innocence. If evidence of prior crimes is admitted to
impeach a defendant in a criminal case, jurors will have difficulty con-
sidering this evidence solely for the purpose of evaluating the defend-
ant's credibility. Instead, the jury may draw either of two legally
impermissible inferences. 6 First, the jury may infer guilt because the
defendant has committed a previous crime and thus probably commit-
ted the crime presently charged.7 Second, the jury could infer that the
defendant should be convicted because the prior convictions demon-
strate that the defendant is a "bad person" who should be incarcerated
irrespective of the guilt for the crime presently charged.8
The possibility that ER 609 evidence9 will be admitted leaves the
defendant in an unenviable dilemma. Many defendants will be
inclined to forego testifying on their own behalf, because they would
be prejudiced by the admission of such evidence. If the defendant
chooses to keep out the prejudicial evidence by declining to testify,
however, jurors will likely infer guilt from silence.10
Such inferences by the jury are precisely the dangers which under-
lay the propensity rule embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE)
404.11 The propensity rule states that, subject to certain exceptions,' 2
the jury is prohibited from learning of the prior ccnduct of a person
not the subject of the present litigation if the only probative value of
that evidence is that it increases the probability that the person acted
in a similar way at a material time.' One important application of this
doctrine is to prohibit the use of evidence of prior crimes to prove that
6. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a
Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 215 (1968) [hereinafter To Take the Stand].
7. See 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Id. §§ 57, 194.
9. "ER 609 evidence" refers to evidence of prior convictions of defendants that can be
admitted against the defendants under evidence rule 609(a).
10. To Take the Stand, supra note 6, at 221 (citing statistics gathered by the American
Institute of Public Opinion, which showed that 71% of the people questioned specifically on the
defendant's failure to take the stand believed use of the privilege was an indication of guilt).
11. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 609[02], at
609-61 (1990); FED. R. EVID. (FRE) 404; ARONSON, supra note 3, at 404-1 (Washington's ER
404 is the same as FRE 404).
12. Three exceptions are given in Rule 404(a): 404(a)(1)-Character of Accused (concerning
pertinent traits of the accused offered by the accused), 404(a)(2)--Character of Victim, and
404(a)(3)-Character of Witness (as provided under rules 607, 608, and 609).
13. WASH. R. EVID. 404; see Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-
bayesian [l?] Analysis and A Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 642 (1991).
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a defendant has a criminal propensity.' 4 Any kind of reliance on such
evidence by the jury is impermissible. 5
This Comment examines the development of the rules concerning
attorneys' use of prior convictions to impeach opposing witnesses in
the State of Washington, particularly focusing on Washington's erro-
neous interpretation of ER 609(a) when prior theft convictions are
used to impeach criminal defendants. After discussing fundamental
problems with Washington's current approach, this Comment
describes three approaches to the admission of prior theft conviction
evidence that could remedy Washington's errors.
I. BACKGROUND
A. General History of the Rules Concerning the Admissibility of
Prior Convictions
The practice of impeaching a witness through the use of prior con-
victions originated in common law.16 In seventeenth century England,
courts disqualified persons convicted of crimes from testifying as wit-
nesses. 7 This disqualification originated as an additional punishment
for the person's crimes.' 8 The disqualification of persons with crimi-
nal convictions, however, sometimes deprived an innocent person of
the testimony of a key witness.' 9 Recognizing this adverse effect,
jurists adopted a new justification for excluding the testimony: that
convicts were of such poor moral character that they could not be
expected to tell the truth.20 As times changed, however, so did the
minds of jurists.2 ' England statutorily abolished the common law dis-
14. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 199-200, 685 P.2d 564, 572 (1984); State v.
Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984), overruled by State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124,
761 P.2d 588 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d at 199-200, 685 P.2d at 572; see also ER 404(b) which
states that although the use of other crimes is not admissible to show that the defendant acted in
conformity therewith, "[the evidence] may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." 'WASH. R. EvID. 404(b).
16. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 93 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
17. State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 676 P.2d 975, 983 (1984) (Brachtenbach, J.,
dissenting) (citing Alan E. Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 CHI. B. REC. 303, 304
(1960)), overruled by State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988).
18. Id.
19. 2 WIGMIORE, supra note 7, § 519, at 609.
20. 2 id.
21. Some experts, such as Wigmore, have credited Jeremy Bentham with changing the minds
of the jurists. Bentham vigorously fought the common law rule disqualifying convicts as
witnesses and demonstrated the illogic of the rule. See 2 id. at 610-11 (citing 7 JEREMY
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowring's ed. 1827)).
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qualification of convicts in 1843.22 Several jurisdictions in the United
States followed suit, including the State of Washington, which abol-
ished the prohibition on testimony by criminal convicts when it
adopted the Laws of 1854.23
B. History of the Admissibility of Impeachment Evidence in the
State of Washington
Dissatisfied with the common law rule, Washington authorized the
impeachment of witnesses through the use of past criminal convictions
by two statutes, Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 5.60.040 and
RCW 10.52.030. The former statute governed the admissibility of
prior convictions in civil cases, while the latter statute governed crimi-
nal cases.24
The legislature adopted RCW 5.60.040 in 1854 as part of Washing-
ton's Territorial Civil Practice Act. The statute removed convicts
from the list of individuals considered incompetent and hence disqual-
ified from testifying in civil cases under common law.2" RCW
5.60.040 applied to both civil and criminal cases and gave trial judges
discretion as to the admissibility of prior convictions.26 The trial judge
permitted the evidence only if the probative value of the evidence out-
weighed its prejudicial effect.27 Washington, however, modified the
scope of RCW 5.60.040 by adopting RCW 10.52.03028 in 1909.
22. 2 id.
23. The statute as originally adopted in 1854 read:
No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving evidence by reason of
conviction of crime, but such conviction may be shown to effect his credibility: Provided,
That no person who shall have been convicted of the crime of pejurl shall be a competent
witness in any case, unless such conviction shall have been reversed, or unless he shall have
received a pardon.
Law of April 28, 1854, § 292, 1854-61 Wash. Laws 99, 151 (later codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.040) (repealed 1985).
24. See generally Mullin v. Builders Dev. & Fin. Serv., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 202, 381 P.2d 970
(1963) (outlining the history of the two statutes).
25. See Law of April 28, 1854, § 292, 1854-61 Wash. Laws 99, 151 (later codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.040) (repealed 1985); Mullin, 62 Wash. 2d at 209, 381 P.2d at 975.
26. Mullin, 62 Wash. 2d at 207, 381 P.2d at 974; see also 5 ROBERT MEISENHOLDER,
WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 300 (1965 & Supp. 1980); WASH. R. EVID. 105.
27. Mullin, 62 Wash. 2d at 210, 381 P.2d at 976 (referring to what is now known as the ER
403 probative value versus prejudicial effect test).
28. The statute read:
Convict as witness. Every person convicted of a crime shall be a competent witness in any
civil or criminal proceeding, but his conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting
the weight of his testimony, either by the record thereof, or a copy of such record duly
authenticated by the legal custodian thereof, or by other competent evidence, or by his
cross-examination, upon which he shall answer any proper question relevant to that inquiry,
and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer thereto.
Evidence Rule 609(a)(2)
In 1909, Washington limited RCW 5.60.040 to civil cases by adopt-
ing RCW 10.52.030 as part of a comprehensive criminal code.29 RCW
10.52.030 mandated that the use of RCW 5.60.040 be restricted exclu-
sively to civil cases, where the fear and repercussions of undue preju-
dice are less significant than in criminal cases.3" RCW 10.52.030
became the governing statute regulating the impeachment of witnesses
through the use of prior convictions in criminal cases. Although
RCW 10.52.030 allowed all convicts to testify, it allowed attorneys to
automatically introduce into evidence the convicts' prior convictions
for impeachment purposes.
The application of RCW 10.52.030, however, created a dilemma for
the innocent defendant with a criminal record. Under the statute, evi-
dence of prior convictions for felonies or misdemeanors was admissible
in criminal cases to impeach any witness, including a defendant who
took the stand.'1 Furthermore, unlike RCW 5.60.040, trial judges no
longer had any discretion to forbid attorneys from introducing evi-
dence of a prior conviction; admission was mandatory, regardless of
prejudice, or whether the prior conviction was for a felony or misde-
meanor offense.32 As a result, under Washington's liberal admission
standard, an innocent defendant with a criminal record was left with
the choice of either foregoing the constitutional right to testify on
one's own behalf, and allowing the jury to infer guilt, or taking the
stand and being labelled a "bad person" deserving of punishment.33
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 609
Federal lawmakers, confronting statutes similar to Washington's,
attempted to reformulate their rules of evidence to provide an
Law of March 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 38, 1909 Wash. Laws 890, 900 (later codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.52.030) (repealed 1984).
29. Mullin, 62 Wash. 2d at 207, 381 P.2d at 974.
30. See id.; see also 5 MEISENHOLDER, supra note 26, § 300.
31. See, eg., State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208 (1977) (felony); State v.
Maloney, 135 Wash. 309, 237 P. 726 (1925) (misdemeanor; defendant as witness); State v.
Overland, 68 Wash. 566, 123 P. 1011 (1912) (misdemeanors and felonies; defendant as witness).
32. State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 676 P.2d 975, 979 (1984), overruled by State v. Brown,
111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988); see WASH. REV. CODE § 10.52.030 (repealed 1984); see
also State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208 (1977).
33. D. Joseph Hurson, Note, Proposed Rule of Evidence 609: Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants by Prior Convictions, 54 WASH. L. REv. 117, 120 n.16 (1978); see HARRY KALVEN,
JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966) (referring to a study of cases at the
University of Chicago in which the acquittal rate of a defendant who did not have a record and
took the stand was 65%. On the other hand, using the same evidence contradictions, the
acquittal rate of the defendant who either had a record or failed to take the stand dropped to
38%.); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 43, at 99-100.
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approach less prejudicial to defendants. The result, Federal Rule of
Evidence (FRE) 609"4 was a compromise between two diametrically
opposed views in Congress. Opponents of admissibility argued that
the use of a defendant's past convictions during cross-examination was
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.t They contended
that such a practice, if allowed, should be limited to those offenses in
the nature of crimen falsi,37 such as perjury, which had a direct bear-
ing on a witness' credibility."8 Those favoring admission of past con-
victions argued that any illegal conduct was highly indicative of a
person's credibility, and that the exclusion of such evidence would
improperly allow a felon to appear as a law-abiding citizen. 39 Hence,
they argued, all felony convictions should be admitted as evidence.
The congressional compromise emerging out of these two opposing
viewpoints attempted to balance the need to protect the criminal
defendant witness with the desire to provide the jury with as much
relevant evidence as possible.' Congress concluded that crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement were inherently probative and
should be automatically admitted.4 This conclusion is reflected in
FRE 609(a)(2). Congress intended, however, for the category of "dis-
honest" crimes in FRE 609(a)(2) to be restrictively construed.42 Con-
gress placed all other crimes punishable by imprisonment of over one
year under the discretion of the trial judge through FRE 609(a)(1).
Consequently, the court could exclude evidence of crimes defined
under FRE 609(a)(1) if it determined that the evidence presented a
risk of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading a
jury to convict the defendant on the basis of the defendant's prior
criminal record.43
34. The text of FRE 609 is almost identical to the text of ER 609 provided in supra note 2.
35. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 609.1, at 463--64.
36. See Rules of Evidence: Hearings before the Special Subcom?. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No.2 at 68
(1973) (statement of Congressman David W. Dennis).
37. Crimes in the nature of crimen falsi include crimes the commission of which involves
some element of deceit, fraud, untruthfulness or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity
to testify truthfully. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7061.
38. Id.
39. See 120 CONG. Rac. 1414 (1974) (statement of Congressman Hogan).
40. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, § 609[01], at 609-50; see also Hurson, supra
note 33, at 121.
41. H.R. RaP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7103. Crimes of dishonesty and false statement are viewed as inherently probative because of the
assumption by lawmakers that past lying is predictive of future lying.
42. See Hurson, supra note 33, at 125-27.
43. Id. at 121.
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L Development of FRE 609(a)(2) in Federal Courts
The majority of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals abide
by an interpretation taken from the federal legislative history of FRE
609(a)(2). Eight circuits strictly define crimes of dishonesty, and hold
that theft convictions are not automatically admissible.' Ten circuits
expressly hold that FRE 609(a)(2) excludes general theft crimes and
encompasses only those crimes that include an element of deceit,
untruthfulness, or false statement.45 Additionally, seven of the ten cir-
cuits hold that the trial court may inquire into the underlying facts of
a prior conviction in order to determine whether it was a crime involv-
ing dishonesty or false statement.46 These courts hold that although
theft is not necessarily a crime of "dishonesty or false statement," it
may nevertheless be admissible under FRE 609(a)(2) if the theft at
issue was actually committed by fraudulent or deceitful means.47 In
these seven circuits, therefore, to impeach a witness using a prior theft
conviction, the government must produce facts demonstrating that the
prior crime involved fraud or deceit.48 For example, in United States
44. See, eg., Linskey v. Hecker, 753 F.2d 199 (Ist Cir. 1985); United States v. Yeo, 739 F.2d
385 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that theft is not a crime involving "dishonesty or false statement"
under rule 609(a)(2) unless it was committed by fraudulent or deceitful means); United States v.
Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d
Cir.) (dictum), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Government of V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. See United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 871 (lst Cir. 1982) (holding that evidence
of purse snatching is not admissible under FRE 609(a)(2) because there were no facts suggesting
that the crimes were perpetrated by fraudulent or deceitful means); United States v.
Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); United
States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1977); Smith, 551 F.2d at 364 n.28 (stating that if an offense involved nothing more than stealth,
the conviction could not be introduced under [FRE 609(a)(2)]); if on the other hand, the offense
involved false written or oral statements, the conviction would qualify for admission as a crime of
"dishonesty or false statement"); United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976);
Government of V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1976).
46. United States v. Yeo, 739 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d
867 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Toto, 529
F.2d at 281 (absent "special circumstances" conviction of petit larceny is not a crime of crimen
falsO.
47. See, eg., United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Smith,
551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
48. See supra note 46.
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v. Glenn,4 9 the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's prior grand
theft and burglary convictions were inadmissible, because there was no
indication that the crimes were actually committed by fraudulent or
deceitful means.5 °
2. Adoption of ER 609 in Washington State
In 1979, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the Washington
Rules of Evidence (ER). Although it altered other parts of the rules,
the court adopted verbatim Evidence Rule 609 from the Federal Rule
of Evidence (FRE) 609.51 This rule superseded both RCW 5.60.040
and RCW 10.52.030.
Just as under the Federal Rules, ER 609(a) provides two instances
where criminal convictions may be used to impeach the credibility of a
witness. First, under ER 609(a)(1), evidence of convictions punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year may be admitted if the
trial court determines that the probative value of the conviction out-
weighs its prejudicial effect.52 Second, under ER 609(a)(2), evidence
of convictions that involve dishonesty or false statement are automati-
cally admissible. ER 609(a)(2) does not allow the court to consider
the severity of the punishment or to weigh the prejudicial effect or the
probative value of such evidence.
D. Judicial Development of ER 609(a)(2) in Washington
Although early Washington decisions purported to adopt implicitly
the compromise position of FRE 609, subsequent Washington
Supreme Court decisions have shown that the state h as embarked on a
separate path. The first opportunity for the Washington Supreme
Court to determine which crimes involve dishonesty for purposes of
49. 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982).
50. Id. In addition, several federal courts have held that petit larceny and shoplifting are
inadmissible under FRE 609(a)(2) because they involve no fraud or deceit. See, e.g., United
States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (attempted petit larceny inadmissible); United
States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1978) (shoplifting conviction inadmissible); United
States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977) (shoplifting conviction inadmissible).
51. State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 3-4, 676 P.2d 975, 979 (1984), overruled by State v.
Brown, III Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988).
52. This balancing approach, probative value versus prejudicial effect, is derived from ER
403. ER 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. WASH. R. EVID. 403. It should be
noted, however, that ER 403 presumes that the evidence is admissi'le unless shown to be
prejudicial, see id., while ER 609 presumes that the evidence is inadmissible unless it is shown
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudice. See supra note 2, for the text of
ER 609.
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ER 609(a)(2) was presented in State v. Burton."3 In Burton, the
defendant's past criminal convictions for petit larceny and shoplifting
were admitted against him on cross examination, and he was con-
victed of first degree robbery of a gas station.5 4 The Washington
Supreme Court held that Burton's past convictions for stealing did not
constitute crimes of dishonesty and should not have been admitted
under ER 609(a)(2). 55
In defining crimes of dishonesty, the Burton court looked to and
embraced the legislative history surrounding the adoption of FRE 609.
The legislative history suggested that Congress defined crimes of dis-
honesty to include only such crimes "as perjury or subornation of per-
jury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense,
or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi ....,56 Relying on
the congressional view, the Burton court reasoned that, while in a
broad sense theft is always dishonest, crimes of theft in general do not
contain the requisite element of untruthfulness. The court therefore
held that misdemeanor crimes of theft were generally inadmissible
under ER 609(a)(2) unless the details of the crime revealed some ele-
ment of fraud or deceit.5 7
The Burton court also concluded that the admission of prior convic-
tion evidence detrimentally affected defendants' constitutional rights
to testify in their own defenses."8 The court based this conclusion on
the premise that "[t]he admission of prior conviction evidence by its
very nature is highly prejudicial because of its inherent implication
that 'once a criminal, always a criminal.' , The court reasoned that
because of this potential prejudice, the definition of what offenses con-
stitute crimes of dishonesty or false statement should be strictly con-
strued.60 A broad definition, according to the court, would unfairly
present the defendant witness with a "Hobson's choice.",6' The
defendant could either testify and risk the effects of the inherent preju-
53. 101 Wash. 2d 1, 676 P.2d 975 (1984), overruled by State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761
P.2d 588 (1988).
54. Id. at 3, 676 P.2d at 978.
55. Id. at 9-10, 676 P.2d at 981.
56. Id. at 6-7, 676 P.2d at 980; see supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text; see also 5A
KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 235 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992); State v.
Newton, 109 Wash. 2d 69, 743 P.2d 254 (1987).
57. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 10, 676 P.2d at 981-82.
58. Id. at 9, 676 P.2d at 981.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 10, 676 P.2d at 981.
61. Id. at 9, 676 P.2d at 981. Hobson's choice is defined as the necessity of accepting one
of two or more equally objectionable things. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1076 (1976).
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dice associated with prior conviction evidence, or refuse to testify and
risk the effects of not presenting one's side of the story.62 The Burton
court adopted a restrictive approach to the admissibility of evidence
under ER 609(a)(2) to avoid placing the defendant in such a
position.63
Though consistent with the federal interpretation, the Burton stan-
dard lasted only four years. The Washington Supreme Court departed
from Burton and changed its definition of crimes of dishonesty in State
v. Brown (Brown I).' In Brown ,65 the defendant refused to take the
stand after the trial court ruled that his prior criminal convictions
were admissible against him for impeachment purposes." The jury
subsequently convicted the defendant of second degree theft.67 The
defendant's past crimes involved a deceptive scheme in which he
offered his victims a television set and a VCR at a greatly reduced
price, drove with the victims to a location in Seattle, and then took
their money without delivering the merchandise. 61 The dishonest
nature of this crime persuaded the court to reverse Burton and include
crimes of theft as crimes of dishonesty.69
In reversing Burton, the court held that its previous adoption of the
federal legislative history and federal decisional law in defining crimes
of dishonesty was misguided.7" The Brown I court wrote that the pre-
vious interpretation did not place enough emphasis on the actual lan-
guage of the rule, specifically on the "ordinary mea:aing" of the word
"dishonesty."71 The court therefore adopted the Webster's Dictionary
definition of dishonesty, which defined the term "dishonest" to include
"the act or practice of telling a lie, or of cheating, deceiving, and steal-
62. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 9, 676 P.2d at 981 (citing To Take the Stand, supra note 6, at
218); see also Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV.
334 (1979).
63. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 10, 676 P.2d at 981-82; see also supra notes 57-62 and
accompanying text.
64. 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988), rev'd, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989)
(Brown I). The Washington Supreme Court reconsidered this case and reversed its position in
State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989) (Brown 11).
65. State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988) (Browr I).
66. Id. at 129, 761 P.2d at 592.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 127-28, 761 P.2d at 591.
69. Id. at 156, 761 P.2d at 605. In so holding, the court chose not to differentiate among
different types of theft. Id.
70. Id. at 150, 761 P.2d at 603.
71. Id. at 152, 761 P.2d at 603.
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ing."72 The court concluded that because crimes of theft involve steal-
ing, they are clearly encompassed within the term "dishonest."73
The holding of Brown I was also short lived. In State v. Brown
(Brown I/),7 the Washington Supreme Court reconsidered Brown I,
and reversed its position again. In a split decision consisting of a plu-
rality and two concurrences, the court held that theft crimes were not
per se admissible as crimes involving misrepresentation and false state-
merits." Five justices, in two concurring opinions,76 rejected the rule
that crimes of theft are per se "dishonest" and endorsed the more
restrictive definition of "crimes of dishonesty or false statement"
presented in Burton.77 The five justices concluded that only theft
crimes involving active deception were admissible under ER
609(a)(2). 78
The Washington Supreme Court issued its most recent ruling bear-
ing on the overall classification of theft crimes as crimes of dishonesty
in State v. Ray.79 In Ray, the defendant was convicted of first degree
incest involving his daughter.8" The trial court denied defendant's
petition to admit evidence of his daughter's past criminal conviction
for theft, offered for the purpose of impeaching her credibility as a
witness.8' The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling and ordered that evidence of the daughter's theft conviction be
admitted. In so doing, the court explicitly reversed Burton, and
attempted to clarify Brown II by holding that crimes of theft involve
dishonesty and should be per se admissible.82 The Ray court stated
that its decision "returned to the basics"83 and adopted verbatim "the
72. Id. at 154, 761 P.2d at 604 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 650 (1981)).
73. Id. at 154, 761 P.2d at 604.
74. State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989) (Brown 11).
75. See id. at 558-60, 782 P.2d at 1034-35.
76. The lead opinion in Brown 11 was signed by only four justices. The other five justices
signed concurring opinions. State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989) (Brown
11).
77. State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 676 P.2d 975 (1984), overruled by State v. Brown, 111
Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988); see also State v. Newton, 109 Wash. 2d 69, 743 P.2d 254
(1987) (holding that theft crimes are inadmissible as crimes of dishonesty).
78. Brown II 113 Wash. 2d at 558-60, 782 P.2d at 1033-35.
79. 116 Wash. 2d 531, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991).
80. Id. at 536, 806 P.2d at 1224.
81. Id. at 543, 806 P.2d at 1227.
82. Id. at 543-44, 806 P.2d at 1227-28.
83. Id. at 545, 806 P.2d at 1228 (quoting State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 551-52, 782 P.2d
1013, 1031 (1989) (Brown 11)).
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ordinary meaning of the word" rationale used in Brown I and reiter-
ated in Brown II "
Since Ray, Washington courts have struggled to determine whether
"crimes of dishonesty or false statement" extend beyond theft. On the
one hand, the courts have expanded the scope of dishonest crimes to
include not only theft but also possession of stolen goodsY Previous
convictions for the possession of stolen property are therefore auto-
matically admissible. On the other hand, burglary convictions are not
automatically admissible as "crimes of dishonesty or false statement"
because burglaries may not always include theft. 6 Such conflicting
interpretations demonstrate the confusion in Washington State over
the definition of "crimes of dishonesty or false statement."
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM IN WASHINGTON
A. Problems with Washington's Current Approach
Washington's current approach on the admissibility of prior theft
convictions is overinclusive and unfair to criminal defendants. Under
current Washington law, all theft crimes are automatically admissible
as crimes of "dishonesty or false statement." Washington's liberal
interpretation of crimes of "dishonesty or false statement" fails to
establish a link between past theft crimes and future behavior. This
failure makes the discretionary portion of ER 609(a) superfluous.
Additionally, Washington's interpretation forces defendants into the
Hobson's choice described by the Burton court. Moreover, the liberal
approach violates the strong judicial interest against propensity evi-
dence. Finally, Washington courts achieve no real benefits to counter
these drawbacks.
84. Id.; see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
85. State v. McKinsey, 116 Wash. 2d 911, 810 P.2d 907 (1991) The defendant in McKinsey
was charged with first degree trafficking in stolen property and two counts of burglary. Id. at
912, 810 P.2d at 908. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and
reasoned that because the statutory elements of the crime included knowingly receiving,
retaining, possessing, concealing or disposing of stolen property, the crime was one of dishonesty
under the "ordinary meaning of the word" reasoning of Brown II and Ray. Id. at 913, 810 P.2d
at 909.
86. Although McKinsey demonstrates the Washington Supreme Court's expansionist ten-
dency towards the interpretation of crimes of "dishonesty or fal'se statement," the Washington
Court of Appeals has since established some limits on the supreme court's liberal interpretation.
State v. Watkins, 61 Wash. App. 552, 556-57, 811 P.2d 953, 955-56 (1991) (holding that a
burglary conviction was automatically admissible under ER 605(a)(2) only if the record before
the trial court showed that the burglary involved theft).
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1. Washington's Interpretation Fails to Achieve a Necessary Link
Between Past Theft Crimes and Future Behavior
The federal legislative history of FRE 609(a)(2) indicates that the
drafters intended for crimes of dishonesty to include only crimes of the
nature of crimen falsi 17 The definition of crimes involving dishonesty
or false statements is of critical importance, because the presumption
behind automatic admission, that the probative value of crimes of dis-
honesty or false statement exceeds any prejudicial effect to the defend-
ant, is inappropriate if the term "dishonesty" is defined too broadly.8"
When Washington adopted verbatim the congressional language of
Rule 609, it implicitly adopted the compromise position of Congress.8 9
This suggests that the Washington Legislature intended that admis-
sion under ER 609(a)(2) be limited to crimes of the nature of crimen
falsi, as suggested by the congressional compromise.90 Washington's
verbatim adoption of the FRE 609 indicates its acceptance of the
interpretation given to that rule by the federal courts and legislature.9
The current interpretation of ER 609 in Washington, however, dis-
torts that intent.
Washington adopted ER 609 to restrict the all-encompassing reach
of RCW 10.52.030,92 which had forced Washington courts to system-
atically admit into evidence all previous convictions.93 As the Wash-
ington Supreme Court stated in Burton, the only purpose of allowing
impeachment by prior conviction evidence under ER 609 is to shed
light on the defendant's credibility as a witness. 94 Prior convictions
87. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text; see also State v. Newton, 109 Wash. 2d 69,
743 P.2d 254 (1987); State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 676 P.2d 975 (1984), overruled by State v.
Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988).
88. See ARONSON, supra note 3, at 609-9; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16,
§ 43, at 99-100.
89. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 6, 676 P.2d at 980 (citing Judicial Council Comment, ER 609, 91
Wash. 2d 1150 (1978)); see, e.g., Eberle v. Sutor, 3 Wash. App. 387, 389, 475 P.2d 564, 566
(1970) (stating that "[w]here a federal rule has been adopted as the state rule, the construction of
the former should be applied to the.latter"); see Rinke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 47 Wash. App.
222, 225, 734 P.2d 533, 536 (1987) (stating that because the texts of CR 17(a) and its federal
counterpart are identical, Washington courts should use the federal court interpretations of the
corresponding federal rule as persuasive authority when interpreting the state rule); see also
Hurson, supra note 33, at 118 n.4.
90. By stating in Brown I that it is not bound to follow federal interpretation of ER 609, the
Washington Supreme Court has ignored a common understanding in Washington courts in order
to achieve a desired result. See supra note 89.
91. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92. See Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 3-5, 676 P.2d at 978-79; see also Judicial Council
Comment, ER 609, 91 Wash. 2d 1150 (1978); supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 92.
94. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 7, 676 P.2d at 980.
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admitted for impeachment purposes must therefore have some rele-
vance to the defendant's propensity to tell the truth.95
Theft crimes, however, are generally distinguishable from crimes
involving false statement or false testimony. The latter crimes are pro-
bative of the credibility of the witness because they demonstrate a
direct history of lying, whereas a person's prior theft conviction does
not necessarily indicate that the person is likely to lie under oath. If
we assume, as our judicial system does, that past acttons are predictive
of future actions, then a history of lying displays a future possibility of
lying. This predictive paradigm, however, breaks down when the past
action is not similar to the future action. In this case, using theft to
predict lying is a non sequitur. Shoplifting, for example, is often a
compulsive act requiring nothing more than the physical action of
stealth. Bad as it may be, shoplifting "does not carry with it a tinge of
falsification." 96 Failure to respect property, however, does not indi-
cate a propensity to lie under oath.97 It has little to do with the verbal
act of lying required to perjure oneself on the stand." Simply because
a defendant has committed a theft crime in the past does not mean
that the defendant will lie when testifying.99 Because theft and lying
are dissimilar, using theft to discredit a witness is simply a return to
the archaic "bad person" standard condemned by Wigmore. 100
2. The Discretionary Portion of ER 609(a) Is Superfluous
Washington's overbroad definition of crimes of dishonesty has made
the discretionary provisions of ER 609(a)(1) useless and has returned
the courts to virtual automatic admission standards. To be admissible
under ER 609(a)(1), prior convictions must be punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, and the court must determine that
the probative value of the prior convictions outweighs their prejudicial
effect.' 10 Many crimes such as robbery, burglary, and kidnapping,
may have punishments in excess of a year, but are of little probative
95. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
96. United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding that shoplifting
does not demonstrate a propensity to lie on the stand and is therefore inadmissible under FRE
609(a)(2)).
97. Id.
98. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d at 10, 676 P.2d at 981.
99. Id. at 8, 676 P,2d at 980; see also Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some
Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM.
L.Q. 88, 88-89 (1972) (stating that a person who has stolen in one situation is not necessarily
likely to lie in a second situation).
100. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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value as to the defendant's veracity. When balanced against their prej-
udicial effect, 10 2 evidence of these convictions would be inadmissible
under ER 609(a)(1). In Ray, however, the Washington Supreme
Court adopted the view that dishonesty inheres in almost any criminal
offense other than assaultive felonies. 103 In so holding, Ray violated at
least two canons of statutory construction.
The first canon misconstrued by the Ray interpretation of ER 609 is
that words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning and should be so
construed as to agree with the evident intention of the statute or to
make the statute operative."° The Ray court attempts to give "dis-
honesty" its ordinary meaning, but its interpretation of ER 609
ignores the intent of the statute as promulgated by its legislative his-
tory. This interpretation renders ER 609 inoperative by placing it in
an internal conflict.' 05 Critics of this form of textualism, used by
Washington, assert that reliance on the dictionary definition of statu-
tory words often results in interpretive blunders. 10 6 By placing too
much emphasis on the dictionary meaning of the word "dishonesty,"
the Ray court is guilty of exactly such a blunder. Because all crimes
arguably contain some element of dishonesty, they are automatically
admissible under Ray's interpretation of ER 609(a)(2). Such an inter-
pretation not only ignores the intent of ER 609, but also violates the
fundamental prohibition against propensity evidence that runs
through the laws of evidence.' 0 7
Additionally the Ray interpretation of "dishonesty" violates the
cannon of statutory construction requiring courts to read statutes so as
to give effect to all parts. l s In defining the word "dishonesty" too
broadly, the Washington Supreme Court has failed to give effect to all
parts of ER 609. The Ray court has made felony and misdemeanor
crimes that would have been inadmissible under the ER 609(a)(1) bal-
102. See State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 558-59, 782 P.2d 1013, 1034 (1989) (Brown II)
(Utter, J., concurring in the result).
103. In Brown II, 113 Wash. 2d at 553, 782 P.2d at 1031, the court stated that at least
assaultive felonies would not fall within ER 609(a)(2) as crimes of dishonesty. In State v. Ray,
116 Wash. 2d 531, 545-46, 806 P.2d 1220, 1228-29 (1991), the court explicitly adopted the
reasoning in Brown IL
104. See, eg., Karl N. LLewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 404 (1950). The
stated canon is a combination of two opposing canons mentioned in the Llewellyn article.
105. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
106. See Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62
U. CoLo. L. REv. 37, 57 (1991).
107. See infra note 119.
108. LLewellyn, supra note 104, at 404.
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ancing test automatically admissible under ER 609(a)(2), thereby
eliminating the need for the discretionary balancing authority under
ER 609(a)(1). o9 By making nearly all prior convictions automatically
admissible, the court has rendered ER 609(a)(1) superfluous and has
defeated the purpose of adopting ER 609, which was to return discre-
tion to trial judges."10
3. The Defendant's Dilemma Persists
The liberal interpretation of crimes of "dishonesty and false state-
ment" in Ray places the defendant in an unfair dilemma. Besides
rendering ER 609(a)(1) superfluous, the court's interpretation is prob-
lematic because prior convictions may readily be misconstrued as evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt.I1 I A jury, upon hearing of the prior
conviction, will be tempted to treat the bad act as evidence not only
that the defendant is lying from the witness stand, but also that the
defendant acted as alleged in the case at hand.1 2 Such an inference
presents defendants with the same hollow choice they faced under
RCW 10.52.030.113 Defendants must choose between testifying in
their own defense and facing the inherent prejudice associated with
prior conviction evidence, or foregoing the constitutional right to tes-
tify and allowing the jury to infer guilt from their silence. 14
Scholars advocating the Ray court's interpretation of crimes of "dis-
honesty and false statement" argue that safeguards such as limiting
instructions issued to the jury setting out the proper use of impeach-
ment evidence alleviate the problem of undue prejudice.115 As the
Washington Supreme Court has recognized, however, such limiting
instructions are frequently, if not always, ineffective. 1 6 In addition,
studies have shown that juries customarily ignore limiting instructions
109. See State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 676 P.2d 975, 981 (1984), overruled by State v.
Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988).
110. See Judicial Council Comment, ER 609, 91 Wash. 2d 1150 (1978) (The Washington
Supreme Court explicitly chose to impose more restrictions on admissibility by adopting ER
609.); see supra notes 6-10, 58-63 and accompanying text.
111. State v. McKinsey, 116 Wash. 2d 911, 916, 810 P.2d 907, 910 (1991) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 33.
113. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
115. See State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 133, 761 P.2d 588, 593 (1988) (Brown I) (stating
that where the courts admit evidence of prior crimes under ER 609(a) for the purpose of
impeaching a witness' credibility, "an instruction should be given that the conviction is
admissible only on the issue of the witness' credibility, and, where th5 defendant is the witness
impeached, may not be considered on the issue of guilt").
116. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 27 Wash. 2d 186, 177 P.2d 387, ajf'd on reh'g, 27 Wash. 2d
193, 181 P.2d 830 (1947); see also Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1957)
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and use evidence of prior convictions to draw prejudicial and legally
impermissible inferences.1 17
4. Washington's Current Approach Violates the Strong Judicial
Interest Against Propensity Evidence
Allowing the jury to infer current guilt from past crimes" 8 goes
directly against the strong judicial interest in prohibiting propensity
evidence.119 Although impermissible, 20 Washington's current inter-
pretation of ER 609(a)(2) perpetuates court reliance on propensity evi-
dence.121 Even though the purpose of admitting prior conviction
evidence is to impeach the witness' credibility, studies show that
admission of such evidence significantly increases the chances of a
guilty verdict. 122 The studies attributed their result to juries' tendency
to perceive prior convictions as proof not only of the defendant's lack
of veracity, but also of the defendant's general propensity to commit
crimes. 23 This combination causes the jury to believe it is more likely
that the defendant committed the crime charged.124
Jury examinations conducted by the researchers at the University of
Chicago, for example, indicated a widespread inability or unwilling-
ness of jurors to understand or follow the court's instruction on the
use of a defendant's prior criminal record for impeachment pur-
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (stating
that limiting instructions are intrinsically ineffective).
117. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text; see also Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra
note 99, at 89 (stating that the assumption that limiting instructions are effective is unsupported
in psychological literature).
118. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
119. See WASH. R. EVID. 404(b) (prohibiting the introduction of "[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith .... "); see also Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A
Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of
Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HARV. L. REv. 426, 440 (1964) ("The admission of character
evidence for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility seems wholly inconsistent with
the principle of the propensity rule.").
120. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
122. See, eg., James E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on
Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 598-600 (1985) (stating that the
increased chance of a guilty verdict arising from the admission of prior conviction evidence is too
prejudicial because it flies in the face of the presumption of innocence and the Anglo-American
notion that we try cases rather than people); W. R. Cornish & A. P. Sealy, Juries and the Rules of
Evidence, 1973 CRim. L. REv. 208 (In an experiment, the number of jurors voting to convict a
defendant rose 30%, after being exposed to the impeachment evidence of the defendant's past
conviction.); see also supra note 33.
123. See To Take the Stand, supra note 6, at 220.
124. See id.
Washington Law Review
poses. 125 Jurors almost universally used the defendant's prior convic-
tions to conclude that the defendant was a bad person and therefore
was more likely to be guilty of the crime charged.126 Because the jury
is likely to misuse the admission of prior convictions to infer that the
defendant has a criminal propensity rather than a propensity to lie on
the stand, the crimes admitted under ER 609(a)(2) should be limited.
5. Automatic Admission of Prior Conviction Evidence Is Not
Necessary
If the automatic admission of prior conviction evidence could be
shown to be an indispensable part of the truth-finding process, these
problems would be justified. Automatic admission of prior theft con-
victions, however, adds only negligibly to the truth-finding process. 127
In light of the other protections aimed at aiding the jury in their truth-
finding function, the admission of prior conviction evidence is unnec-
essary to ensure that a jury does not overestimate the veracity of a
criminal defendant, for two reasons. First, the jury naturally distrusts
a criminal defendant and is suspicious of the defendant's self-inter-
ested testimony. 2 ' Second, the criminal defendant's testimony is sub-
ject to rigorous testing in the context of an adversarial proceeding
before the jury. The combined effect of the elements of confrontation:
physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and jury's observation of
the witness' demeanor, serves the purpose of evaluating the credibility
of the defendant's testimony. 129 There is very little likelihood that a
jury will afford a defendant's testimony more weight than it
deserves. 130 The truth-finding mission of the criminal process is thus
not furthered by automatic admission of past criminal convictions.
The combination of these problems and the dispensability of auto-
125. Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 777 (1961) (citing letters from Dale W. Broeder, Associate Professor, the University of
Nebraska College of Law, and Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor, the University of Chicago Law
School, both of whom conducted intensive jury interviews).
126. Id.
127. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 122, at 615 ("The jury's ability to determine whether
defendants are lying from their demeanor as witnesses and from their reactions to questions on
cross-examination eliminates the need for impeachment by evidence of prior convictions.").
128. Id. at 614-15 (citing several studies supporting the dispensability of the use of prior
criminal convictions for impeachment purposes).
129. See, ag., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (discussing different methods of
evaluating a witness' testimony); see also Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, Factors
Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 169,
169-94 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (discussing nonverbal factors in
determining credibility).
130. See, e.g., Joel Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant-Witness by Prior Conviction, 6 CRIM.
L. BULL. 26, 27 (1970) (jurors are reluctant to put much faith in the defendant's testimony).
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matic admission standards suggest a need for reforming Washington's
current approach.
B. Three Possible Solutions
Washington currently has at least three options available to correct
the problems associated with admitting evidence of prior convictions.
The first approach would eliminate ER 609(a)(2) and subject the
admission of all prior convictions to the balancing approach of ER
609(a)(1). The second approach would rewrite ER 609(a)(2) to
expressly define "crimes of dishonesty or false statement." The third
approach, as utilized by most federal courts, would allow the trial
court to consider the circumstances leading to the past criminal con-
victions before ruling on their admissibility. Although all three mod-
els are viable solutions to Washington's problem, the Washington
Supreme Court should adopt the third model because it best balances
the competing interests involved in the admission of prior criminal
convictions.
1. The Deletion Model: Eliminate ER 609(a)(2)
Eliminating ER 609(a)(2) would subject all prior criminal convic-
tions to the balancing approach of ER 609(a)(1), thereby balancing the
probative value of a prior conviction against its prejudicial effect. This
approach considers automatic admissibility under ER 609(a)(2)
unnecessary because most crimes that involve dishonesty or false state-
ment, and are therefore probative of a defendant's veracity, would be
admissible under the balancing approach of ER 609(a)(l). 13 1 Con-
versely, all crimes that are not probative of the defendant's truthful-
ness or are unfairly prejudicial would be excluded. In an example
provided by Congressman Dennis during legislative hearings, the pros-
ecution in a case against a labor riot leader may wish to bring up evi-
dence that the defendant was previously convicted of stealing a car.1 32
In this instance, the defendant's past criminal conviction would proba-
bly have no bearing on the validity of his defense or his propensity to
testify honestly. Yet, if admitted, the jury may think that the defend-
ant is a bad person and therefore more likely to be guilty of the crime
charged.1 33 Accordingly, a court would consider evidence of the prior
131. Although most crimes involving dishonesty or false statement would be admissible
under ER 609(a)(1), some crimes may be excluded because they would not meet the one year
imprisonment requirement. Those few crimes, however, would probably be of little probative
value.
132. See supra note 36.
133. See supra note 125.
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conviction highly prejudicial with only low probative value and would
rule the evidence inadmissible.
One advantage of the deletion model is that it would eliminate the
negative aspects of the defendant's Hobson's choice. By deleting ER
609(a)(2), a criminal defendant witness would be faced with a "Hob-
son's choice" only when past crimes are relevant to the defendant's
credibility. Procedurally under ER 609(a)(1), the trial judge would
rule on the admissibility of the potentially prejudicial conviction evi-
dence prior to the commencement of trial. If the prior conviction evi-
dence is too prejudicial, the judge will exclude it using the balancing
approach and the defendant will be free to take the stand without
being subjected to cross examination regarding prior convictions.13 4 If
the judge believes the evidence bears on the witness' veracity, the judge
will admit the evidence, and the witness would have a choice.
Although the choice is parallel to the "Hobson's choice," it is a choice
the witness made fair through previous deceit. In this way, the dele-
tion model would advance the truth-finding mission of the trial court.
2. The Statutory Limitation Model: Rewrite ER 609(a)(2) to
Expressly Define Crimes of "Dishonesty or False
Statement"
A second approach would be to amend ER 609(a)(2) to include the
exact definition of crimes of "dishonesty or false statement." The new
statute would include an express list of those crir.aes that would be
admissible because they are in the nature of crimen falsi. Using fed-
eral legislative history new language would be added to ER 609(a)(2)
as follows:
Crimes of dishonesty or false statement include only crimes such as per-
jury or subornation of pejury, false statement, criminal fraud, embez-
zlement or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen
falsi, the commission of which involves some element of untruthfulness,
deceit, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify
truthfully. 135
This approach would eliminate the admission of highly prejudicial,
yet irrelevant crimes, by significantly limiting the type of crimes
134. But see State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 533-41, 782 P.2d 1013, 1021-25 (1989)
(Brown II) (adopting the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984), that denial of defendants' motions in limine to exclude evidence of prior
convictions for purposes of impeaching their credibility under rule 609(a) cannot be preserved or
raised on appeal unless the defendants actually testify).
135. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7103; see generally supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
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admissible as evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness. This
proposal limits the automatic admission of evidence to those crimes
determined to be directly relevant to the witness' credibility and elimi-
nates the current practice of introducing, under the guise of impeach-
ment, evidence of highly prejudicial crimes that are marginally, if at
all, probative of the defendant's veracity. 3 6 The only crimes admitted
against the defendant witness would be crimes expressly defined as
possessing the nature ofcrimenfalsi. The courts would not be permit-
ted to deviate from the definition by looking beyond the necessary ele-
ments of the offense to determine whether the offense was actually
committed in a fraudulent or deceitful manner.
Although this approach alleviates the problem of the admission of
nonprobative evidence, it does not prevent all prejudice to the defend-
ant witness. This prejudice, however, is not undue. Crimes of the
nature of crimenfalsi reflect directly on the defendant witness' propen-
sity to lie on the stand. Any prejudice caused by their admission is
subordinate to the strong public policy of providing the jury with as
much relevant evidence as possible. 137 This approach serves the pur-
pose of impeachment evidence by enlightening the jury as to the
defendant's credibility as a witness.
3. The Federal Model: A Viable Compromise
Washington should adopt a third approach, using a combination of
the Burton analysis and the federal approach, to determine whether a
prior conviction actually involved dishonesty or false statements.
Under this approach, the Washington courts would narrowly define
the scope of crimes of dishonesty, using as their guide federal legisla-
tive history and its definition of crimes of dishonesty as ones of the
nature of crimen falsi. In addition, Washington courts would adopt
and follow the federal approach and allow the trial court to inquire
into the underlying facts of a prior conviction in order to determine
whether the conviction was for a crime involving false statement or
dishonesty. 13 8 Such an analysis would be consistent with the majority
of the federal circuits. 139 This analysis would also comport more
136. See Ed Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other Name... :A Proposal To Limit
Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 785 (1990).
137. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text. Such an approach is not totally new to
Washington. In State v. Watkins, 61 Wash. App. 552, 811 P.2d 953 (1991), for example, the
court looked into the circumstances of a crime of burglary to see whether it involved theft for the
purposes of impeaching a witness. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 45.
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closely with common sense and everyday notions of fairness. It is
incomprehensible that a petty theft conviction is admissible to
impeach a witness regardless of its prejudicial effect, while a past con-
viction for murder is only admissible if it survives a balancing test."4
If either is to be admissible, both categories of crimes should be subject
to the balancing approach.
The third solution presents a compromise between the first and sec-
ond solutions. Under this solution, much like the statutory limitation
model, Washington courts would use the narrow definition of dishon-
est crimes represented by the category of crimes of the nature of cri-
men falsi. Crimes within the nature of crimen falsi would be
automatically admissible without further review by the trial court.
Unlike the statutory limitation model, however, the courts would be
allowed to look at the facts underlying prior convictions, other than
those within the automatic admissibility category, to determine
whether the defendants in fact engaged in any dishonest behavior.
This approach is also similar to the deletion model because it would
require the courts to look at each circumstance individually to deter-
mine its admissibility. Unlike the deletion model, however, this
approach would be more consistent with the congressional compro-
mise over FRE 609 because it would allow for some crimes that would
be per se admissible.
Under the federal model, the problem of the admission of nonproba-
tive evidence would be eliminated. Only crimes with a direct bearing
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully would be admissible.
Such crimes would include not only crimes which involve fraud or
deceit as an element of the crime (crimes of the nature of crimen falsi),
but also crimes that were in fact perpetrated through the use of fraud-
ulent or deceitful means.
This solution would also greatly reduce any undue prejudice to the
accused. By looking at the underlying facts of the prior conviction,
the court would admit only evidence that was actually indicative of
the accused's propensity to lie on the stand. The purpose of impeach-
ment evidence is to enlighten the jury as to the defendant's credibility
on the witness stand. If the prior conviction is probative of the
defendant's willingness to lie, then any resulting prejudice would be
justified.
140. State v. Ray, 116 Wash. 2d 531, 555, 806 P.2d 1220, 1234 (1991) (Dolliver, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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III. CONCLUSION
Evidence Rule 609(a) has been one of the most intensely debated
rules of evidence in the State of Washington. The Washington
Supreme Court has changed its interpretation of this rule four times in
the past eight years. Its most recent interpretation is plagued with
problems. Washington's current liberal approach to the admission of
prior theft convictions fails to establish a necessary link between past
theft crimes and future behavior. Furthermore, the interpretation ren-
ders the discretionary portion of ER 609(a)(1) superfluous. In addi-
tion, the current interpretation is contrary to the judicial interest
against propensity evidence and forces the defendant into a Hobson's
choice without providing any substantial counterbalancing benefits.
In effect, the current approach places defendant witnesses in the same
unfair position they would have been in prior to the adoption of ER
609.
In order to realize the goals of ER 609, Washington should construe
the definition of "dishonest" crimes in ER 609(a)(2) more restric-
tively. The adoption of one of the three approaches proposed here
could help Washington achieve this goal. First, Washington could
eliminate ER 609(a)(2) and subject all prior convictions to the discre-
tionary test of ER 609(a)(1). Second, Washington could statutorily
define crimes of dishonesty or false statement and limit admission to
only those crimes. Third, Washington could automatically admit a
very limited number of convictions as crimes of dishonesty and also
allow trial courts to review the circumstances surrounding the other
prior convictions to determine whether the defendant in fact engaged
in dishonest behavior. Because the third approach best balances the
societal interests of truth-finding and protecting the innocent, it should
be adopted by Washington State.
